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MORENO L. (2002) Decentralization in Spain, Reg. Studies 36, 399–408. Since the transition to democracy in the late 1970s,
Spain has undergone a process of deep decentralization and an incipient federalization. This article analyses the main features
of such processes underlying the high level of home rule achieved by the 17 Comunidades Auto´nomas, when compared to other
federal-like systems in the world. Accommodating Spain’s secular diversity appears to be in line with the increasing role of
meso life in the process of Europeanization.
Decentralization Intergovernmental relations Regional identities Territorial accommodation
INTRODUCTION and peoples with no other aYnity than their coexistence
under the rule of one common monarch or political
Some countries face a national dilemma. Spain, rather, power. However, the social and cultural cohesion that
has a dilemma of nationalities. This is chie y cultural makes up Spain’s unity does not obliterate its internal
and political with interregional disparities tending also rivalries. As has happened in the past, concurrence
to reinforce internal cleavages. among Spanish nationalities and regions has brought
The ethnic and linguistic1 variety of Spain, governed about an extra cultural incentive for creativity and civil-
by actors, institutions and political forces that have ization, but it has also been used as an excuse for open
confrontation (MORENO, 1997).traditionally been both weak through ineYcacy and
strong through violence, has too often resulted in After a long hyper-centralist dictatorship (1939–75),
a peaceful transition to democracy (1975–79), and andamage to its unity. Moreover, there has been a tradi-
tional lack of congruence or a ‘non-congruence’ active involvement in the process of Europeanization
after its accession to the European Economic Com-between political and economic powers.2 Catalonia
and the Basque Country, the two northern peripheral munity (1986), Spain has undergone deep and far-
reaching social transformations. In economic terms, forSpanish communities with full ethnic/cultural poten-
tial, have remained as two of the three economically instance, Spanish development has been spectacular. In
1959 the Spanish GDP per head was 58·3% of the EUmost dynamic territories of Spain, the third being the
region of Madrid. This non-congruence has tradition- mean; in 1985 it had increased to 70·6%, and by 1998
it had grown further to 81·5%.3 No other country inally nourished the centrifugal tendencies present in
modern Spanish history. Such tendencies have found the group of the advanced industrial democracies has
achieved a ‘catching-up’ process of similar proportions.expression in a number of armed con icts: the Revolt
of the Reapers, 1640–1652; the War of the Spanish With the disappearance of the dictator General
Franco, the rise of demands for regional self-Succession, 1701–1714; the Carlist wars, 1833–1840,
1846–1848 and 1872–1875; the Tragic Week of Barce- government reaYrmed Spain’s spontaneous inclination
towards the autonomy of its nationalities and regions.lona, 1909; and,  nally, the Civil War, 1936–1939.
Despite its secular con icts of internal ethnoterritorial The democratic parties had fought against Franco’s
attempts of cultural genocide, repression and reinven-accommodation, Spain is an entity clearly identi able
as a country of countries, or a nation of nations. This tion of history but did not have a clear-cut model for
the type of decentralized state they broadly advocated.unity goes beyond the simple aggregation of territories
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Nevertheless, they shared the conviction that the legiti- DUAL IDENTITIES AND
macy of democratic power was inexorably linked to TERRITORIAL ACCOMMODATION
implementing home rule of the country’s nationalities
Decentralization and federalization in Spain hasand regions.
developed in an inductive manner, step by step. BothThe constitutional expression of such a strong plat-
Jacobin centralists encroached in sections of the publicform presented a great political challenge, for Spanish
administration and in some in uential Spanish parlia-modern history had witnessed tragic failures in the past
mentary parties, together with representatives of thewhen regional aspirations and the territorial sharing of
minority nationalisms (principally, Basque and Catalan),power were concerned. However, the wide inter-party
have favoured bilateral and ad hoc centre–peripherypolitical consensus that made possible the drawing up
relationships. They have shown reluctance to encourageof the 1978 Constitution succeeded in overcoming old
horizontal and multilateral processes of decisionreticence and mistrust. It also brought with it an
making. This attitude is a major obstacle for theelement of ambiguity in the formulation of the Estado
‘natural’ unfolding of the Estado de las Autonomõ´ as intode las Autonom õ´ as (‘State of Autonomies’), which is the
a federal-like system of government.name given to the new democratic and decentralized
A phenomenon of the foremost importance in thestate. Two diVerent conceptions of Spain, which had
Spanish context, and which provides the sociologicaltraditionally confronted each other, were formulated.
bases for the federalizing rationale of the Estado de lasSubsequently, a via media was negotiated, which expli-
Autonom õ´ as, concerns the manner of self-identi cationcitly recognized one Spanish state as an ensemble of
by a majority of Spaniards. These identify themselvesdiverse peoples, historical nationalities and regions, and
in a way which implies shared loyalties to both thewhich has as supreme constitutional principles those of
central state and the meso layers of government. Theliberty, justice, equality and political pluralism.
concept of dual identity or compound nationalityThe text of the 1978 Constitution re ected many of
incorporates in variable proportions the regionalthe tensions and political stumbling blocks that existed
(ethnoterritorial) ascriptive identity and the nationalat the time of the inter-party discussion on the terri-
(state) identity. As a result of this, citizens share theirtorial organization of the state. However, the constitu-
institutional loyalties at both levels of political legiti-tional provisions also mirrored a widespread desire to
macy without any apparent fracture between them.5reach political agreement. As a result, the 1978 Spanish
The quest for self-government by meso-level com-Constitution made it possible for one, three, all or
munities is in full accordance with the variable mani-none of the Autonomous Communities (Comunidades
festation of such duality in citizens’ self-identi cation:Auto´nomas, which comprise historical nationalities and
the more the primordial regional (ethnoterritorial) iden-regions)4 to be self-governed. It depended on the
tity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher thepolitical will expressed by the inhabitants of the Auto-
demands for political autonomy. Conversely, the morenomous Community (Comunidad Auto´noma), or by
developed the national (state) identity is, the less likelytheir political representatives. It also made it possible
it would be for ethnoterritorial con icts to arise. Atfor the degree of self-government to be wide or
the other extreme, complete absence of one of the tworestricted according to the wishes of the nationalities
elements of dual identity would lead to a deep socio-and regions. With the passing of time, de jure asymmet-
political division. If this were the case, demands for self-ries have been equalized somewhat, although the exer-
government would probably take the form of a claimcise of self-government implies de facto political
for secession and outright independence. In otherdisparities and diverse policy outputs implemented by
words, when citizens in a sub-state community identifyeach Comunidad Auto´noma.
themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional out-Let us recall that the Spanish 1978 Constitution does
come of such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive.not include the word ‘federal’ in any of its provisions.
The consistency in the results provided by periodicalNevertheless, the Estado de las Autonomõ´ as can be con-
surveys on dual identity in Spain is to be underlined.sidered an instance of ‘devolutionary federalism’. The
Note that the Basque Country and the Canary Islandsprocess of federalization in Spain will involve de facto
are the two Comunidades Auto´nomas where singlearrangements of power delimitation in its three-tier
regional/ethnoterritorial identity is higher than 20%system of government (local, intermediate and central)
(26·8% and 21·7%, respectively). However, and in abefore its federal-like arrangements take shape within
survey immediately carried out before the 2001 Basquethe European Union. Once this situation has been
elections, those who declared to feel ‘only Basque’ wereachieved, a constitutional revision should incorporate
23% of the total, whereas 41% identi ed themselves ‘asthese divisions of powers functionally thus avoiding the
Basque as Spanish’.6great political diYculties which would have occurred
In Galicia, Catalonia, Balearic Islands and Asturias,had the process developed inversely. The ‘open model’
single regional self-identi cation is higher than 10% ofof home-rule-all-round established by the 1978 Consti-
the total of survey respondents. Spanish single identitytution has consequently evolved into a gradual process
of top-down ‘federalization’ (MORENO, 2001). is more signi cant in Castille-La Mancha. ‘Don’t
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know/no answer’  gures are considerably low as com- disposable per capita income and gross per capita
income is positive, while in richer regions the resultspared to the usual percentages produced in this kind of
survey. This  nding seems to con rm the lack of are negative. These data seem to corroborate the
assumption that public sector transfers have contributedindiVerence among Spaniards on the cultural and insti-
tutional implications of self-identi cation and the pro- considerably to reduce regional inequalities (AYALA ,
1994).cess of decentralization.
In the whole of Spain, more than two-thirds of its A recent study con rms the trend that poorer Com-
unidades Auto´nomas are catching up with richer ones.citizens express a dual identity or compound nationality,
thus incorporating both regional and state identities During the period 1989–95, the regions with higher
economic growth were the Canary Islands (8·3%),without apparent contradiction between them. Dual
identity provides the sociological bases for the articula- Andalusia (7·8%) and Galicia (7·1%), as compared with
the more sluggish Catalonia (6·5%) and Valencia (6·5%)tion of the Estado de las Autonom õ´ as, which has largely
transcended past patterns of internal confrontation. (BOSCH and CASTELLS , 1997).
Diverse estimates carried out on the evolution ofEven for the Basque Country, where there is a high
proportion of popular self-identi cation as ‘only recent regional and individual economic disparities in
Spain have con rmed that a reduction of inequalitiesBasque’ (around 27%), the majority of citizens express
a degree of duality (around 57%) that highly conditions concerning the per capita family income among Com-
unidades Auto´nomas has taken place during the 1990s.the viability of secessionist options (see Table 1).
Indeed, the peculiarities of both processes of state Further to this, evidence has shown that territorial
imbalances account for only around 10% of the personalformation and nation building in modern Spain explain
to a high degree how citizens express their territorial inequalities and have tended to decrease during the
1980s. Finally, personal redistribution produced by theidentities and institutional allegiances. Accordingly, it
can be said that the most compelling variable for the impact of direct taxation, social contributions and mon-
etary transfers has reduced regional disparities in Spainfuture federalization of Spain rests upon the
strengthening – or otherwise – of such duality of greatly by between 25% and 34% (MERCADER
PRATS, 1997).identities. The possibility of con ict is always present.
However, in the period of time elapsed since the
inception of the 1978 Constitution territorial co-
operation and agreement in Spain has overcome old
FINANCING AND PUBLICmisunderstandings. It has also provided a deepening of
EXPENDITUREdemocracy by means of a more eVective access of civil
society to political decision making. There are two diVerent systems of  nance for the
Autonomous Communities: the special regime and the
common regime.7 The  rst is applied to Navarre and
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITIES the Basque Country and the second to the rest. The
Navarran and Basque communities enjoy a  scal ‘inde-As a preliminary consideration, it should be observed
that in Spain there is not such an abrupt north–south pendence’ in which they collect their own taxes for
personal income, companies and VAT.8 The Navarrandivide as is the case in Italy (some basic regional data
are shown in Table 2). Traditionally, the hinterland and Basque executives transfer a previously agreed
quota to the central state Treasury. These transfersaround the capital Madrid has been an economic
periphery (both Castilles, Extremadura and part of represent compensation for Spanish common expendi-
ture, and to cover the costs of running those stateAragon), while the geographical periphery in the
North (Basque Country) and the East (Balearic Islands, administrative bodies located in Navarre and the Basque
Country. As a consequence, the two ComunidadesCatalonia, Valencia) has had important growth poles
and industrial zones. Andalusia in the South and Galicia Auto´nomas under the special regime enjoy a higher
degree of autonomous public expenditure. Note thatin the North West have remained as poorer areas.
Politically the geographical periphery has tended to be at the end of the 1990s, the per capita public spending
of the Basque Country was 1·8 times higher than, formore European-looking and modernized. But Madrid
and Andalusia have also been strongholds for progres- instance, Catalonia. This greater  scal capacity has
provided the Basque Country with better  nancialsive ideas and leaders.
De facto economic asymmetries have had decisive manoeuvrability for policy innovation. These  nancial
diVerences and management capacities enjoyed by therepercussions for the decentralization process, and are
associated with numerous arguments relating to the special regime Comunidades Auto´nomas have neverthe-
less brought about an incentive for the less-developedpractice of interregional solidarity and the equal sharing
of  nancial burdens. regional administrations to catch up with those more
advanced in new policy design and provision. AOn comparing gross and disposable regional
incomes, a small but signi cant change can be noted ‘demonstration eVect’ regarding the implementation
of new regional programmes by the Comunidades(see Table 3). In poorer regions the diVerence between
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Table 2. Spanish regional data
% per capita regional Population, 1998
% share of Spanish GDP European Union
Autonomous Communities GDP, 1996 mean 5 100, 1998 Inhabitants % total
Andalusia 13·3 58·9 7,236,459 18·2
Aragon 3·4 88·7 1,183,234 3·0
Asturias 2·5 69·5 1,081,834 2·7
Balearic Islands 2·5 125·8 796,483 2·0
Basque Country 6·1 93·4 2,098,628 5·3
Canary Island 3·7 79·4 1,630,015 4·1
Cantabria 1·3 75·7 527,137 1·3
Castille-La Mancha 3·6 65·1 1,716,152 4·3
Castille and Leon 6·1 74·7 2,484,603 6·2
Catalonia 19·4 100·7 6,147,610 15·4
Extremadura 1·9 59·7 1,069,419 2·7
Galicia 5·5 68·7 2,724,544 6·8
La Rioja 0·7 91·5 263,644 0·7
Madrid 16·1 103·0 5,091,336 12·8
Murcia 2·4 65·1 1,115,068 2·8
Navarre 1·6 95·4 530,819 1·3
Valencia 9·6 81·3 4,023,441 10·1
Ceuta and Melilla1 0·3 60·3 132,225 0·3
Spain 100·00 81·5 39,852,651 100·0
Note: 1. Spanish North African cities.
Source: Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadõ´ stica (Census-Register 1998, National Accounts); and FUNDACI O´N BBV, 1999.
Table 3. Gross and disposable regional per capita income relative to national average
1981 1992
Disposable Disposable
Regions Gross income income Disposable 2 gross Gross income income Disposable 2 gross
Andalusia 71·1 80·3 9·2 69·4 81·6 12·2
Aragon 100·8 101·6 0·9 105·8 105·6 2 0·2
Asturias 98·4 106·6 8·2 90·1 95·5 5·4
Balearics 121·0 122·3 1·3 125·2 124·4 2 0·7
Basque Country 116·9 107·8 2 9·1 109·7 99·3 2 10·4
Canaries 88·9 90·3 1·4 87·0 90·1 3·2
Cantabria 106·0 100·6 2 5·4 99·9 95·3 2 4·6
Castille-LM 71·9 78·6 6·7 76·9 87·1 10·2
Castille/Leon 82·5 87·3 4·8 85·7 93·3 7·6
Catalonia 126·9 122·1 2 4·8 129·4 122·6 2 6·8
Extremadura 63·3 73·6 10·3 60·0 76·4 16·4
Galicia 81·2 89·4 8·2 81·1 93·5 12·4
La Rioja 101·0 101·2 0·2 107·8 113·2 5·5
Madrid 143·2 122·4 2 20·8 139·3 109·0 2 30·4
Murcia 74·7 82·8 8·2 80·1 91·8 11·7
Navarre 104·6 101·2 2 3·4 112·9 107·1 2 5·8
Valencia 97·8 101·1 3·3 102·4 108·1 5·8
Ceuta/Melilla — — — 72·8 79·2 6·5
Total 100·0 100·0 100·0 100·0
Source: AYALA, 1994, p. 162.
Auto´nomas has induced a ‘virtuous circle’ for policy the whole state, as well as from European funds.10 After
an agreement of the Council for Fiscal and Financialinnovation in the case of Spain.9
Until 1994, the 15Comunidades Auto´nomas run under Policy on 7 October 1993, the Communities under the
common regime came to receive 15% of the total per-the common regime had obtained their main  nancial
resources through the concession and management of sonal income tax collected in their own territory. Later
on, this percentage rose to 30% for the period 1997–certain taxes ( judicial acts and municipal taxes, luxury
and heritage taxes, inheritance tax and transfers, gam- 2001, although not all the Comunidades Auto´nomas
accepted the calculations for the implementation of thisbling taxes), from their share of the domestic income of
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Table 4. Territorial distribution of public expenditure in Spain (%)
19811 1984 1987 1990 1992 1997 20012
Central 87·3 75·6 72·6 66·2 63·0 59·5 54
Regional 3·0 12·2 14·6 20·5 23·2 26·9 33
Local 9·7 12·1 12·8 13·3 13·8 13·6 13
Notes: 1. Beginning of the process of devolution.
2. Government’s estimates.
Source: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations.
arrangement. Such a percentage compares to 46% for per capita in Catalonia, while in the ‘fast route’ regions
(e.g. Andalusia, Galicia) investment reached 85,000,the states of the US, 34% for the Canadian provinces or
29% for the German La¨nder. It indicates a change of and 114,000 in those of the ‘slow route’ (e.g. Asturias,
Murcia).approach in the  nancing of theComunidades Auto´nomas.
The impact of the new concessions on the  nancial The  nancing issue is one of the thorniest for
its direct implications in the level of regional self-resources of the 15 common regime Autonomous
Communities will be moderate in the foreseeable government in Spain, as well as for the diYculty it
entails for the conciliation of the views and interests offuture. The political cost for the autonomous executives
will be minimal, given that it can be seen as a continua- the 17 Comunidades Auto´nomas. It seems as if the
alternative to a method of  scal co-responsibility wouldtion of taxes previously conceded. Many autonomous
governments continue to display ‘blame avoidance’ be one of ‘tributary confederation’ along the lines of
those enjoyed by Navarre and the Basque Country.practices, and they point to the central administration
for their own political failures alleging ‘limited’  nan- That is to say, the Comunidades Auto´nomas would collect
most of the taxes and would then pay the state previ-cial resources. Given the fact that many responsibilities
in the running of their governmental responsibilities ously agreed sums or quotas for the general state
budget. This possibility is desirable insofar as it wouldare shared with the central authorities, it is always
possible for the Comunidades Auto´nomas to consider be clearer for the citizens to assess expenditure
responsibilities by mesogovernments of the Comunid-the central state a ‘scapegoat’. All things considered,
percentage changes in public expenditure clearly illus- ades Auto´nomas. However, it would also require greater
speci cation where the principle of solidarity is con-trate the proportions of the devolution of power in
Spain. Between 1981 and 1997, central government cerned, in the form of explicit transfer requirements
between rich and poor communities. All things consid-expenditure dropped from 87% to 59% of the total,
and regional spending rose from 3% to 27%. Local ered, asymmetries in the income-raising and the
spending capacities of the Spanish Comunidades Auto´n-spending increased from 10% to 14% (see Table 4).
Although the Autonomous Communities can place omas could further reinforce the concurrent nature of
the Spanish model and thus improve public eYciency insurcharges on personal income tax, the Spanish meso-
governments have shown reluctance to take this option the provision of public goods and services (MORENO,
2001).given its probable unpopularity. One of the con-
sequences of these ‘blame avoidance’ practices is the
great diYculty for many voters to judge and ascribe
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSpolitical responsibility in central, regional or even local
spending. It also emphasizes the instrumental role of After 20 years of Spain’s process of decentralization,
central government in budgetary distribution, creating the level of home rule achieved by the Comunidades
more confusion for the electorate and limiting the Auto´nomas is high if compared to other federal-like
exercise of  nancial autonomy by the Comunidades systems in the world. However, the institutional
Auto´nomas. involvement of the Spanish nationalities and regions in
The asymmetrical system of regional  nancing state-wide decision making is somewhat provisional in
implies further diYculties for attaining a certain degree character. The general political consensus, intergovern-
of horizontal equalization foreseen in various constitu- mental co-operation and consociational practices in
tional clauses. In particular, it raises questions with Spain have been left unaided by the institutional liaison
respect to the general desire for greater  scal eYciency mechanisms available. Among the factors that have
and inter-territorial solidarity. In September 1994, the contributed to these institutional shortcomings, the
President of the Catalan Autonomous Government, inadequacy of the Senate as a territorial chamber is
Jordi Pujol, graphically complained in the Senate about surely a major drawback in the functioning of the
the burden of inter-territorial solidarity for Catalonia: Estado de las Autonom õ´ as. However, our attention in this
of every 100 pesetas handed over to the state Treasury, section is focused on the discretion of the Sectoral
Conferences.Catalonia got 70 back. The state invested 55,000 pesetas
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In the Conferencias Sectoriales, high ranked oYcials why the number of contested laws by either central or
regional governments has decreased sharply in recentand political representatives of both central government
and Comunidades Auto´nomas meet to discuss sectoral times.
In 1993 the number of challenges submitted to thematters in order to maximize intergovernmental co-
operation and to avoid con icts. In 1982, the  rst was Constitutional Court were only 12 as compared to the
131 in 1985. The level of constitutional con ict overestablished: the Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy
of the Autonomous Communities (Consejo de Pol õ´ tica competencies has been high in comparison to other
European countries (i.e. about 960 challenges in theFiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Auto´nomas). By
1989, there already existed 17 forums. Ten years later, period 1981–97). However these  gures are somewhat
misleading if we take into account the particular charac-24 sectoral conferences had been set up: agriculture;
civilian protection; consumer aVairs; culture; drugs; teristics of the process of decentralization in Spain,
namely the inductive manner in which powers haveeducation; environment; European aVairs;  scal and
 nancial policy;  sheries; health; infrastructure; indus- gradually been allocated among the three-tier system
of government. The undisputed institution enjoyingtry and energy; labour; public housing; public per-
sonnel; research and development; social aVairs; the highest inter-party agreement for the solving of
con icts has precisely been the Tribunal Constitucional.telecommunications; tourism; traYc; transport;
universities; and water. On the more technical issue of the ultra vires, or
legislation passed beyond the scope of the responsibili-At  rst, the Autonomous Communities were con-
cerned that the Sectoral Conferences could be trans- ties in each level of government, the Tribunal Constitu-
cional has carried out a crucial function in the gradualformed into institutional mechanisms controlled by the
central administration in order to intervene in areas delimitation of powers. Challenges to laws, decree laws
and legislative decrees, either by the Spanish or theof power of regional competence.11 Gradually such
uneasiness gave way to an increasing mutual trust. regional parliaments, have been judged by the Court
in a manner that con rms the federalizing trend towardHowever, these Conferences are not institutions for
joint decision making.12 Meetings and contacts are the ‘sharing of rule’ between central and regional levels
(AGRANOFF and RAMOS GALLARI´N , 1997).irregular and do not always respond to an already  xed
agenda. Co-operation seems to depend a great deal on
the personal attitudes of the political oYcials involved CONCLUDING REMARKSand on the political mood in general.13 The exchange
of information, nevertheless, is an important element. The territorialization of politics in Spain has manifested
itself in the proliferation of regionally-based partiesSome analysts regard them as mechanisms of ‘institu-
tional courtesy’ (GRAU I CREUS, 2000). Alternatively, (PALLARE´S et al., 1997).15 Internal asymmetries in
Spain have also expressed themselves in a wide andSectoral Conferences are viewed as the shift from a
competitive regionalism to co-operative federalism,14 varied mosaic of political parties. This is not a hindrance
for parties with country-wide aspirations. But evenalong the lines of the German model (BO¨RZEL, 1999).
political organizations receiving state-wide public sup-
port have structured themselves in line with the federal
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND texture of Spain. This aspect brings about a further
THE DELIMITATION OF POWERS element of ‘pork barrel politics’16 to a system where
the territorial dimension has become decisive.The arbitrating responsibility of the highest Spanish
tribunal has been of paramount importance for the After 20 years of the implementation of the  rst
Statues of Autonomy (Basque Country and Cataloniasubsequent implementation of the Estado de las Auton-
omõ´ as. It has among its powers the authority to decide in 1979), the process of decentralization of power has
consolidated and has achieved a higher degree of pop-on legal con icts between the central state and the
Comunidades Auto´nomas, or even con icts among the ular support. At the turn of the millennium, the
tendency towards decentralization has sifted into thelatter. Let us remember that, according to the 1978
Constitution, there is a need for partisan compromise consciousness of most Spaniards. The socialization and
internalization of value related to the territorial struc-on the nomination of candidates to the Constitutional
Court. This circumstance has provided the Tribunal turing of the Estado de las Autonomõ´ as has deepened as
compared to the beginning of the process.Constitucional with a great deal of authority and inde-
pendence. Based on this legitimacy, central and regional In 1996, the assessment of the setting-up of the
Comunidades Auto´nomas was judged ‘positive’ by two-governments have appealed to the Court, and have
accepted their judgements subsequently, when the thirds of Spaniards (see Table 5). Other  gures are also
very signi cant: (1) in 1996, 3% of Spaniards were inoption of a bilateral political negotiation was not pos-
sible. On many occasions the challenge to a national favour of a state without Comunidades Auto´nomas, as
compared to 9% in 1994; (2) in the same period, theor regional piece of legislation has served the purpose of
‘gaining time’ in order for further political negotiations support for the same type of State of Autonomies grew
from 31% to 47%; (3) there was an increase of supportbetween the parties involved. This signi cantly explains
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Table 5. Assessment of the setting-up of the Spanish Comun- reassertion of territorial identities and the implementa-
tion of the principles of subsidiarity and democraticidades Auto´nomas (%)
accountability in the process of Europeanization.
October 1994 March 1996
Positive 51 67
Negative 19 13 NOTESNeither positive nor negative 11 8
‘Don’t knows’ 10 16 1. Castilian, or Spanish as it is usually referred to elsewhere,
is the oYcial language of the Kingdom of Spain.Source: Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo´gicas (CIS, Opinion
Approximately a quarter of the Spanish total populationData, No. 5)
of 40 million is bilingual. Their vernacular languages are
also oYcial in their respective territories: Catalan (spoken
by 4·2 million in Catalonia; 2·1 million in Valencia; 0·2Table 6. Preferences for the territorial organization of Spain (%)
million in the Balearic Islands; and 0·05 million in
1984 1990 1996 Aragon); Basque (0·7 million in the Basque Country;
and 0·05 million in Navarre); Galician (2·3 million).Central government without
Other oYcial languages, as declared in their regionalComunidades Auto´nomas 9 7 3
Statues of Autonomy, are Bable (spoken by 0·4 millionComunidades Auto´nomas as at
in Asturias) and Aranese (0·004 in Catalonia). (Datapresent 31 41 47
Comunidades Auto´nomas with collected from SANMARTI´ ROSET , 1997, p. 67. ) There
more home rule 20 19 22 are also a number of dialects of the aforementioned
Comunidades Auto´nomas with languages widely spoken in other regions (Andalusia,
possibility of secession 10 7 7 Canary Islands, Extremadura, Murcia).
‘Don’t knows’ 19 16 11 2. The traditional political and economic non-congruence
in Spain has been translated into a permanent rivalrySource: Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo´gicas (CIS, Opinion
between centre and periphery (G INER and MORENO,Data, No. 5)
1990). Historically, this dichotomy has been re ected
in two main alternative models of state organization:
centralist-authoritarian and federalist-democratic. Onfor the maintenance of the Autonomous Communities
the types of economic and political non-congruence,with a higher degree of home rule (from 20% to 22%)
see GOUREVITCH , 1979.(see Table 6). This data further legitimates continued
3. Spain would reach the EU mean level of 100% by thepolitical decentralization.
year 2025 if the annual ‘catching-up’ percentage of 0·8%
The decentralization process now needs to adapt to is maintained.
new forms of intergovernmental relations, especially at 4. Historical nationalities are the Basque Country, Cata-
the level of institutional collaboration.17 The articula- lonia and Galicia. The remaining regions are Andalusia,
tion of institutional relations involving shared powers Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Canta-
and responsibilities lies at the very base of the federaliz- bria, Castille-La Mancha, Castille and Leon, Extremad-
ura, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre and Valencia.ing relations of Spain.
The North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla have alsoThe Estado de las Autonom õ´ as has, to a large extent,
been chartered status as self-governed territories.transcended patterns of internal confrontation in Spain.
5. The question put to them in successive surveys has beenThe deep and widespread process of decentralization
as follows: ‘In general, would you say that you feel . . .can be regarded as one of progressive federalization in
1. Only Basque, Catalan, Galicia, etc.; 2. More Basque,line with the asymmetrical nature of Spain’s composi-
Catalan, Galician, etc., than Spanish; 3. As much Basque,
tion. It serves the purpose of accommodating a secular Catalan, Galician, etc. as Spanish; 4. More Spanish than
diversity within the unity of a state member of the Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc.; 5. Only Spanish; 6.
European Union. Don’t know; 7. No answer’. For a study on the case of
The pillars of civic culture in Spain appear at present Catalonia, see MORENO et al., 1998.
to consolidate the tendency towards agreement and for 6. The aggregate percentages of those with a degree of
dual identity were 61% as compared to 28% of thosethe toleration of dissent. The legacy of past civil
declaring a single or exclusive self-identi cation (i.e.confrontations is still considerable. Besides, the eVects
‘only Basque’ or ‘only Spanish’). Note that, amongof political violence in the Basque Country continue
PNV voters, the most voted nationalist party in theto be the negative referent in the generally peaceful
Basque Country, a third of the respondents declared tocohabitation of the Spanish territories and peoples. An
be ‘only Basque’, the same amount of those who identifyexpression of the modernizing character of home rule
themselves ‘as Basque as Spanish’ (El Pa õ´ s, 7 May 2001).
demands by the Comunidades Auto´nomas is their Euro- 7. The Canary Islands have some  scal prerogatives inher-
pean vocation, which is symptomatic of a general desire ited from the past, and due to their location far away
to leave behind the long stagnation of the Franco era, from the Peninsula.
and to develop a new form of cosmopolitan localism 8. At the end of 1996 an agreement between the Basque
(MORENO, 1999). This is in line with the increasing Nationalist Party and the Popular Party established that
the Basque  scal authorities could also collect the so-role of the meso life which, in turn, is the result of a
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of the  scal ‘common regime’ (Basque Country andcalled ‘special taxes’ (on petrol, tobacco and spirits).
Soon after, the President of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol, Navarre excluded).
13. Further to the Convenios, the Juntas de Cooperacio´n (bilat-also claimed for Catalonia the power not only to collect
but also to legislate for such ‘special taxes’. On 23 Nov- eral commissions) are another instrument of intergovern-
mental relations in Spain. They serve as informalember 1998 Pujol made proposals for the Generalitat to
collect all taxes in Catalonia after the year 2002, as is the platforms for sorting out con icts over powers, for the
discussion of Convenios and, primarily, for the exchangecase of the Basque and Navarran regional governments.
9. The Family Minimum Income Programme provides an of information. Yet again, they cannot be regarded as
joint decision mechanisms.illustration of this. This was introduced in the Basque
Country in March 1998 to combat poverty and situations 14. This would be the result of the Europeanization of
policy issues. Certainly, multilateral intergovernmentalof social exclusion, and constituted a precedent in the
subsequent programmes of guaranteed minimum income co-operation in Spain is more eVective when European
issues, as opposed to domestic ones, are involved.bene ts implemented in all 17 Comunidades Auto´nomas.
Although showing a degree of diversity in policy design 15. After the 1999 regional elections, the political map of
the Spanish Estado de las Autonomõ´ as was substantiallyand coverage, schemes of ‘minimum income’ developed
by the Spanish regions aim at combining cash bene ts modi ed. A higher degree of heterogeneity in the
composition of the three-tier system of government waswith policies of social insertion (employment promotion
and vocational training schemes, primarily) (MORENO further introduced. At the meso-level, the PP controlled
nine Comunidades Auto´nomas, in coalition with regionaland ARRIBA, 1999).
10. In 1995, the Autonomous Communities managed 10% forces in two of them (Canary Islands and Navarre). Six
other Communities had PSOE governments in coalitionof the monies transferred from the European Cohesion
Funds received for infrastructure and transport, and 40% with other parties, mainly nationalist or regionalist (And-
alusia, Aragon, Balearic Islands). Finally, a coalition ofof those for the environment.
11. Once the dominant actor of the system, now the role nationalists (PNV and EA) governed the Basque Coun-
try, and CiU formed a government with the support ofof the central administration has become that of a
‘middleman’ or broker within a highly decentralized the PP.
16. This expression should not be understood only as a merestate (BAN˜O´N and TAMAYO, 1977).
12. Multilateral Agreements (Convenios) are somehow a illustration of the practices of politicians and government
oYcials to dip for ‘pork’, or funds for regional and localeuphemism to describe joint decision by more than one
Comunidad Auto´noma with the central government. For projects, from the national Treasury. It also implies the
support from regional parties sought by national partiesexample, out of the 424 Agreements signed in 1994,
145 were signed bilaterally only by a single Autonomous to stay in power at the central state.
17. According to 1990 data, most Spaniards considered thatCommunity and the central government. Of the
remaining 279 Convenios, 237 were bilateral adhesions relations between autonomous governments and central
government should be ‘collaborative’ (80·7%), andof other Comunidades to a pre-existing Convenio. As a
matter of fact, only 11 were multilateral Agreements in involving ‘shared responsibilities’ (50·2%) – see GARCI´A
FERRANDO et al., 1994, p. 113.sensu strictu signed by the 15 Autonomous Communities
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